4.Defense Sentencing Objections and Execution-State Ruling
20 linesMS. CLARKE: Thank you, your Honor. Before we -- Mr. Tsarnaev addresses the Court, I wanted to address the Court with regard to a few matters. There have been comments over time with regard to Mr. Tsarnaev lacking remorse and lacking an apology and for being sorry for his actions. And I think it's incumbent upon us to let the Court know that Mr. Tsarnaev offered to resolve this case without a trial as far back as October of 2013, and in January of 2014 provided a letter of apology. But he will also speak today and address those issues as well. It is the government's right to have refused the offer of settlement and the letter, but we're here with legal issues to address.
Mr. Weinreb asked that the Court enter a restitution order today. I would note that the presentence report indicated that the government would be providing a date by which it would submit information with regard to restitution. As a result, we filed nothing in that regard, anticipating litigation would be later. We do need to note to the Court that we that will be objecting to the entry of an order of restitution on the grounds of Apprendi. I know that that's speaking Greek, but the Court understands the language. It is a live and debatable issue, and we think that the Court should not impose the order of restitution.
The same goes for forfeiture. Your Honor, the government filed a forfeiture motion on the 19th of June. It was our understanding that we had two weeks to respond to that, that it would not be entered before we could respond. The same Apprendi argument will apply to the forfeiture order, and we ask that the Court defer until we can raise that appropriately before the Court.
It is my understanding that the recommendation of the government, although I didn't hear it -- but the recommendation of the government and probation, I believe, is that there be no fine imposed because of the lack of ability to pay. We do understand that the Court would be imposing special assessments on each of the 30 counts in the amount of $100 each, for a $3,000 total. We have discussed with the government how that -- how the judgment should read in terms of the responsibility to pay it. As we all know, Mr. Tsarnaev will be serving -- facing executions, awaiting for the execution of his death sentences and will not be having, you know, income.
We would ask that the Court -- we have some language for the Court to include in the judgment. If the Court wants me to say it orally or simply provide it to the Court afterwards, it regards how it -- how the assessment is collected from wages. The language would be "shall be collected from prison wages if any are earned and not from funds deposited in the commissary account." If there is some concern about overages in the commissary account which we do not ever envision but the government has hypothesized about, we would ask that the Court allow there to be a minimum below which the commissary account could not be taken. As the Court knows, that is for some very basic necessities.
THE COURT: Let me just say to that point, I'm inclined to the latter; that is, that there be some fuller, below which assessments cannot be drawn. I don't know whether the Bureau of Prisons has any regular practice with respect to such matters and whether there might already be a regulation that provided that.
MR. WEINREB: I believe there is, your Honor. I believe that the Bureau of Prisons normally takes the position that the first $75 -- basically $75 per month of a defendant's commissary monies are exempt from the payment towards any fines or special assessments, restitution and so on, and that that is pretty standard for --
THE COURT: Well, accepting your representation without researching it, I think that's adequate and we can rest on that, just as to that point.
MS. CLARKE: And I could -- well, we think there should be a slightly higher threshold, but I could also provide the Court with a judgment where language was used and that has been complied with.
THE COURT: Well, no, I think we've resolved that. I think that -- it's amendable. If it turns out to be an issue of some kind --
MS. CLARKE: A clear error.
THE COURT: -- we can readdress it.
MS. CLARKE: The other issue I believe was addressed in the objections in the presentence report, and that is the applicability of supervised release to any sentences other than those that are a term of years. In this case, the term of supervised release is, you know --
THE COURT: I'm not going to impose supervised release in this case. It's unnecessary as a practical matter in light of the other structural sentence I will announce.
MS. CLARKE: Thank you, your Honor.
The other area is what the government filed last night and the proposed language for the judgment following Statute 3596 and then the C.F.R.s. The government filed proposed language and then amended it with a revised proposed, and we don't -- we think the Court needs more thought than that and we should respond.
The government has identified Indiana as the state that the Court should identify in the judgment where the execution will take place. I know that the Court is probably aware of Judge Wolf's analysis in Sampson, and it is more of a balancing act than that. That seems to be a bureaucratic desire on the behalf of the government which, frankly, flies in the face of the government's venue arguments in this case. And Judge Wolf in Sampson noted that it's a -- I can just quote the language. "The execution of a human being by the state is perhaps the most solemn and significant act a government can perform. It should not be reduced to an invisible bureaucratic function. There is, therefore, a strong public interest in the execution being as accessible as possible to the people most interested in and impacted in it." And as a result, Judge Wolf identified the state of New Hampshire because Massachusetts does not have a manner of execution.
We do have some language. I think that probably the most -- the safest course of action for the Court is to adopt the judgment language that Judge Wolf used in Sampson, and we have that and can submit it to the Court. It lays out the language that should be included in the judgment with regard to execution.
THE COURT: Do you want to respond to that?
MR. WEINREB: Your Honor, the defense's proposal, as I understand it, essentially tracks the language of the regulation and adds in this other language based on Judge Wolf's opinion regarding New Hampshire. The regulation is not what controls in this case; it's the statute. I believe it's 18 U.S.C. 3596, is what specifies what the -- how --
MS. CLARKE: I've got it.
MR. WEINREB: -- its implementation in a sentence of death, and it explains the legal requirement.
The statute simply -- the regulation simply directs the government to submit a proposed order. It's not a direction to the Court. And in any event, to the extent that it's not consistent with the statute, the statute controls.
The language that the government proposed in its revised motion which we submitted last night is language that has been worked out over time among various interested parties who actually are involved in the implementation of the sentence, BOP, the U.S. Marshal's Service among them, and is what the government normally recommends in all of these cases. And it is typically, to our understanding, of course, adopted in cases consistent with the statute, and it is a -- it both fulfills the statutory requirements and is a practical set of instructions that the government is familiar with and will facilitate the orderly execution of the sentence.
MS. CLARKE: Well, Judge, I'm not sure that that's exactly right. 3596 provides, "If the law of the state does not provide for implementation of a sentence of death, the Court shall" -- the Court, not the government or the Bureau of Prisons -- "shall designate another state, the law of which does provide for the implementation of a sentence of death, and the sentence shall be implemented in the latter state in the manner prescribed by law." So it is a Court determination of which state will implement the sentence of death.
And Judge Wolf went through a balancing determination in Sampson and determined, as I read one of the reasons -- part of the reasons was because of the people most affected need to have access to the execution and that it is not just a bureaucratic administrative act but a very solemn, profound act by our government.
THE COURT: Okay. This is not an issue that was raised or briefed. It was not formally presented. I did spend some time thinking about it nonetheless and I think the government's suggestion is an acceptable one. Indiana is the location of the institution, Terre Haute, which is the federal death row, as they say in casual language, and I think that makes an appropriate default position. So I will accept the government's recommendation on that.
MS. CLARKE: Your Honor, I have a couple of ministerial matters that do not affect the imposition of sentence and can be delayed. I think Mr. Tsarnaev is prepared to address the Court.
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Tsarnaev.
MS. CLARKE: May I move the microphone?