Judy Clarke

Judy Clarke acknowledged Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's responsibility as defense counsel while arguing that Tamerlan planned and led the crimes. During jury selection, she tested whether conviction would trigger an automatic vote for death and emphasized each juror's individual sentencing judgment. The judge rejected proposed case-specific sentencing questions as attempts to obtain advance commitments. Clarke also announced a fourth change-of-venue motion to preserve the defense's position. In her opening, she expressly declined to argue forced participation; the court permitted discussion of the trial phases but limited influence evidence and excluded family history from that presentation.

Her guilt-phase cross-examinations developed distinctions in the physical evidence and its limitations. Sarah De Lair did not know whether the backpack recovered outside the Forum had undergone fingerprint testing and clarified laboratory handling and separate recovery locations. Patrick Moynihan acknowledged that fingerprints cannot be dated and that driving need not leave identifiable prints; Clarke also developed receipts recovered from Tamerlan's wallet. Christopher Donahue confirmed Dzhokhar's print on the ammunition box's exterior, but Tamerlan's prints, not Dzhokhar's, on the live rounds and Ruger magazine. In closing, Clarke used physical, purchase, phone, and computer evidence to argue against equal leadership, independent radicalization, and deliberate targeting of children. Those were defense arguments, not court findings.

Clarke also challenged the scope and timing of prosecution evidence. She sought to limit responder testimony extending beyond factual observations into personal impact; the judge emphasized guilt-related relevance and restricted Patterson's military-background testimony. When the government sought additional victim testimony to establish a foreign-national jurisdictional component, Clarke argued that reopening after the defense case and its acquittal motion would be prejudicial. The court allowed a stipulation while preserving disputes over sufficiency, an exemption, and reopening. Clarke maintained the objection and said the defense would renew its Rule 29 motion.

In the penalty phase, Clarke developed family circumstances through relationship and medical testimony. Her examinations of Judith Russell and Gina Crawford explored Katherine's changing religious focus and isolation during her relationship with Tamerlan. The court excluded layered hearsay about alleged abuse, and Crawford acknowledged meeting Tamerlan only once and not knowing Dzhokhar. Alexander Niss described Anzor's PTSD, cognitive impairment, and continuing disability. Elmirza Khozhugov described Dzhokhar's childhood, Tamerlan's religious changes, and the brothers' closeness. Clarke sought limits on allegations offered to show Khozhugov's bias; the judge made questioning dependent on his direct testimony, rejected kidnapping terminology, and cautioned against an extended family-feud inquiry.

Clarke's school and developmental examinations added distinct mitigation evidence. Rachel Otty identified a displayed paper about predator drones as apparent homework and gave limited recollections of quiet classroom participation. Eric Traub recalled a kind, engaged student and reaffirmed his college recommendation, while objections limited questions about his present reflections. Jay Giedd explained prolonged adolescent development, environmental influence, and individual variation. The court allowed general developmental evidence but barred individualized testimony.

In her penalty closing, Clarke requested life imprisonment without release, presenting youth, family instability, and Tamerlan's influence as explanations rather than excuses. She relied on Sister Helen Prejean's testimony to argue remorse and emphasized individual sentencing discretion and unanimity for death. She argued that restrictive ADX confinement could provide punishment and security, while conceding that permanent H-unit placement was not guaranteed. At sentencing, she objected to restitution, sought time to respond to forfeiture, and argued that execution-state selection belonged to the court. The court accepted Indiana as the designated state.