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2015 Federal TrialtranscripttranscriptPublicity, Death-Qualification Questions, and Juror Follow-Up Limits - Day 4 - 2015 Federal TrialJudge O’Toole rejected proposed case-specific sentencing and hypothetical acquittal questions, directing juror follow-up primarily toward ambiguities in questionnaire responses.
Steven D. MellinWilliam D. WeinrebDavid I. BruckJudy ClarkeMiriam ConradGeorge A. O'Toole Jr.MR. BRUCKTHE COURTMS. CLARKEMR. MELLINMR. WEINREBMS. CONRADproceduralsidebar
2015 Federal Trial/Day 4/January 15, 2015
11 pages·0 witnesses·1,655 lines
Judge O'Toole explained capital-sentencing rules and questioned prospective jurors about impartiality, punishment, and hardship. He limited case-specific follow-up questions, resolved agreed exclusions and contested challenges, and left a proposed pool-reporter arrangement unresolved.
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Arguments and Rulings on Publicity and Death-Qualification Questions
ProceduralProc.Arguments and Rulings on Publicity and Death-Qualification Questions

MR. BRUCK: Before the next juror comes out --

THE COURT: Is this --

MR. BRUCK: About -- if I may, about the questioning, about follow-up questioning, again, we have no idea what this juror knows or has read. And we would ask the Defendant's 2 follow up -- Number 2 on the general voir dire request be asked to really draw out what this juror knows and has heard about this case. We would ask Number 3 be asked, Number 4.

We would also -- I'm sorry.

MS. CLARKE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: She's got it. Thank you.

(Pause.)

MR. BRUCK: Again, we feel that -- we had hoped that since none of these questions were put into the questionnaire despite our requests, that this would be the time that we would find out what jurors bring into the courtroom given the unprecedented level of publicity and the unprecedented level of direct talk, verbal communication and direct experience of the marathon bombing in this division of the Massachusetts -- of the District of Massachusetts. So we would -- we really feel that it's impossible to assess the impartiality of a juror like this without getting to what he has heard or read.

In addition, it's -- this is a juror who believes the defendant is -- I'm sorry. This is a defendant [sic] who says he's unsure whether he's guilty or not. That covers an awful lot of territory. We think our Number 11 -- our 10 and 11, which asks the juror to imagine that he was on the jury and the government didn't prove its case and they acquitted Mr. Tsarnaev and he went home, and then the juror is asked to say, Well, how do you think people would react, how would you react, how would you feel about that prospect, that gets at whether or not jurors can put it aside; not the verbal formulation of whether they could listen to the evidence and come to their own conclusion.

But this is reality, and there may be jurors who say, If the government didn't prove their case, sure, I could do that. But there are going to be a lot of jurors who will say, Well, we all know he's guilty and people would be furious and there would be an uproar. But if we don't ask the question, we'll never know.

So we think that these questions are really quite critical. In effect, we're asking can these jurors really presume this man innocent or is it a situation where everybody knows he's guilty and let's get on to the penalty phase, but, sure, I could listen to the evidence and, you know, make it look like I was a regular juror.

Secondly -- or maybe it's thirdly, as to the Morgan question, we, of course, will stand on our legal position that we're entitled to ask whether under the charges that have been brought in this case the juror could still consider life imprisonment. We're not asking for all of the facts to be laid out.

And then what we're asking for is for someone who has been charged with a terrorist crime, that is, the use of a weapon of mass destruction, that is the charge in the indictment, could the juror ever impose life imprisonment rather than the death penalty in that case?

The same is true of the statutory aggravating factors which are found in the indictment. They are alleged as special findings. And we think it's important to ask whether -- and we only use a couple of examples, "especially vulnerable victim due to childhood." In other words, if the murder involved a child, under Ring v. Arizona that has the legal equivalent of the element of an offense. Is the jurors' views on the death penalty such that he could never impose the death penalty in that -- life imprisonment, rather, in that situation? Is he talking about a completely different kind of case when he says "I could go either way"? It doesn't matter whether he could impose life imprisonment in a completely different kind of case.

This is not a murder charge; this is a charge of use of a weapon of mass destruction where death results. And Morgan requires that you test the jurors' ability to impose life imprisonment for the crime charged. So we think we are clearly entitled under Morgan to questioning on the -- on that issue.

Finally, even if the Court were to rule against us on that, it would -- we would -- we should nevertheless be allowed to find out whether the juror would always impose the death penalty on somebody where it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally committed a murder or a killing which, of course, has to be proven as a threshold finding.

Those are the only kinds of killings in which it's what's alleged in this case and it's what's required. It doesn't matter whether the juror might vote for life for an unintentional killing because that's not what we're dealing with. It's not what the government has charged. It's not what is on trial in this case. It's purely academic. It would be like saying for the government, Well, I could never impose the death penalty for anyone under the age of 25. The government wouldn't say, Well, that's fine because who knows what age the defendant will turn out to be. That would not be acceptable to the government and it's not acceptable to us and it's not acceptable under the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to be tried by a jury that would impose the death penalty -- or even has a single member that would impose the death penalty for every intentional murder. This juror is a blank slate on that. We don't know because he hasn't been asked.

So those are the questions -- those are why we ask for those follow-up questions, and we really don't think we're going to have a fair jury unless they're asked.

MR. MELLIN: Your Honor, may I respond to that?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MELLIN: As to the issue about the pretrial publicity, I think the Court has been able to determine and assess the credibility of witnesses based on their answers concerning that. If there was some concern that the Court had about their truthfulness about whether or not something they read or saw before they came into Court today, the Court would be able to follow up on that.

Up to this point these jurors have been very clear about the fact that they are not affected by what they have read or seen prior to coming into court. So I don't think there's any need for what Mr. Bruck is asking for, which would be to ask each of these jurors exactly what article did you read or which news story did you see on television. I think that's completely unnecessary. I think in a case-by-case basis based on the answers that a juror gives, I'm sure the Court will ask some follow-up questions, but I think it's unnecessary at this time.

Concerning the Morgan/Witt questions, your Honor, we completely disagree with what Mr. Bruck has said Morgan/Witt requires. He is asking for specific stakeout questions saying in this case where you have an intentional killing and a weapon of mass destruction and a child killed and all of these other aggravating factors, would you be able to consider life imprisonment? That is only one half of the equation.

He is only advising or wanting the Court to advise these jurors of all of the aggravating factors without even talking about the mitigating factors and asking the jurors if they could impose life imprisonment. And that's an unfair question to ask because that is assuming the juror has, in fact, found all of the government's aggravating factors.

So if that is the case and this is the only evidence they have at that time, each of these jurors would be entitled to impose a sentence of death because they have found those aggravating factors. So I think that's completely unfair.

I would suggest maybe an alternative to what Mr. Bruck says by asking these jurors if they understand that if we get to the penalty phase, at that point you will have already found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the actual offenses. When we are in the penalty phase would you be able to meaningfully consider both the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors before you came to a decision as to what the appropriate sentence would be? I think that would cover the issues that Mr. Bruck is talking about without going into any degree of trying to specify specific aggravating factors or mitigating factors.

One last question the government would ask for, your Honor, with some of these jurors, it's not clear when they leave whether or not they would actually be able to impose the death penalty themselves. And so we would ask the Court with those jurors, if the Court would ask them, If you got to the final stage and you actually believed that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors, would you be able to impose -- or vote to impose a sentence of death against another human being.

THE COURT: Well, again, these are follow-up questions to a detailed questionnaire. This goes to both points. Just taking the last one, we do ask them that in the questionnaire. Questions 95 and 96 ask those questions. I don't see any need to repeat questions that they've answered in the questionnaire straightforwardly or perhaps unambiguously. To the extent there is ambiguity -- and in this last case he apparently misunderstood the direction of those questions, and so it was necessary to follow up on that. He answered on the questionnaire, apparently from what he says here today, anyway, opposite of what he meant to say.

As it goes for other matters, I make the same observation about publicity questions. We have detailed answers in the questionnaire concerning what exposure to the media about this is. I don't think as a general matter we have to repeat all of that and get -- there are multiple concerns about that, one of which is committing the witness, the juror witness, to positions that he'll feel he has said here and has to stick with. And so digging for details from someone who hasn't prepared by spending time reflecting and recalling all of that will not likely yield reliable answers and, again, it's a matter I covered in the questionnaire.

With respect to the specificity of the questions about aggravation/mitigation, I agree, essentially, with the government. I think that the kinds of categorical questions are really questions about the case and fall into the category of stakeout. I think it has to be a more general level to be consistent with the principles of those cases. So -- and -- so anyway, I think I will continue to use the more general level with respect to those.

With respect to the -- one final one I guess was raised was what will people think of you if you do this? Again, it's Question 94 that we ask in the questionnaire and people have answered it variously. Some people say they think they would be criticized for it; some people say they wouldn't. So there's no reason to think that people who answered the questionnaire weren't able to understand that and give us an answer.

MR. BRUCK: If I may, your Honor, Question 94 goes only to the question of penalty. Our request is not about penalty; it is about guilt. And that's where the rubber hits the road, I think, in terms of prejudgment in this community. It's the idea of being on a jury that acquits this man and lets him go home, and then people themselves go home and face the members of their family and the people they work with and their neighbors. And I mean, let's face it, we all know how that would be received.

Now, the government may say, Well, it's not likely to happen, and maybe it's not, but we're supposed to have a fair trial. And the trial is not supposed to be over already on the issue of guilt or innocence. I think there is such a pervasive sense that "we know he did it" in this community that we're sort of skipping over that. And the truth of the matter is that there would be such an explosion of outrage if that were to happen. We know that and these jurors know that.

And I think it is critical for the Court to ask them to imagine that and then tell you what they would think themselves, what other people would think of them, and then whether they could really put aside what they've heard. We're not getting to find out what they've heard; let's at least find out what effect whatever they've heard has had on them.

THE COURT: Anything?

MR. WEINREB: Yes. Your Honor, we think that question is unnecessary for several reasons: First of all, it could have been included in the questionnaire, and as far as I know it wasn't even proposed. I don't think it's appropriate to ask it as a follow-up question in every case -- with every juror.

I also think that it's unnecessary to go down that road with every juror, that one could keep asking questions along that line indefinitely, trying to dig down deeper and deeper into whether jurors have foreseen all the possibilities of repercussions if they voted one way or another. The relevant question is simply whether they can -- sitting here today, believe that they can decide the case on the evidence.

I think it's -- that is the question that is traditionally asked, has been asked in voir dire, in my experience in every case, and it seems to have sufficed to give everybody a fair trial up until now, and I don't see this case as being an exception.

And the third point I would make is that it's really asking jurors to speculate about a hypothetical matter that they're in no position to answer at this point. For them to find -- for them to go home and have to tell their friends and family that they were on a jury that found the defendant not guilty, they would have to imagine that the entire jury unanimously found the defendant to be not guilty and that they had discussed the -- they had heard the evidence together, the 12 of them had debated it together, had thoroughly gone through it, and were unable to conclude at the end of that process that the defendant was guilty.

And that can strongly fortify people in their belief that they have done the right thing. And I think that the experience this court has had -- this courthouse has had recently with very high-profile trials in which sentiment was very strongly against the potential defendants -- or public sentiment may well have been very strong against the potential defendants, the jurors have shown no hesitation to find defendants not guilty or to make findings in favor of defendants where they have believed that that is the appropriate thing no matter what the public might have thought -- might think about their answer.

So I think for all those reasons it's an unnecessary question and a question unlikely to yield reliable, meaningful or useful answers.

MR. BRUCK: If I may so the record is clear, we think that question is most likely to get at the underlying issue, which is whether the juror can presume the defendant guilty, not say he does -- presume the defendant innocent, not to say that he does but really presume -- accord the presumption of innocence. If that question would be explained and put to the juror, we would be in much better shape, I think, than with the question never being asked.

So we ask at least for questions getting at whether the juror is capable of presuming this defendant innocent.

THE COURT: Well, I share the concern that hypothetical questions are troublesome because they do not necessarily produce reliable answers. What a juror predicts about his behavior on some future occasion after the experience of the full trial is asking for a very -- I think a very speculative answer and it is one that I think different -- people would react differently to and assess according to criteria that we wouldn't be able to understand or process.

There are multiple occasions when the jurors will be reminded of the burden of proof and so on with respect to guilt. This -- to some extent this area is addressed by Question 77 which asks for the jurors' current state of mind and whether they are able or unable to vary that in their sense.

Some people say "unable," and we will follow up on that; others say -- at least as one of these have done, say that they were able to. And I think to ask for more than an assessment of their anticipated openness or not to get a specific answer about reaction to evidence that they haven't heard would, I think, as I say, put us back into a range of speculation that would not be reliable for judgment.

So I think the combination of questions concerning the findings in 77, and then with respect to the penalty in the later questions, I think the questionnaire, which was jointly prepared, does a pretty good job of addressing those issues. So I don't think it's necessary.

So I guess in summary, the place I do agree with you is we have to look at an openness to someone who may be tending towards a favorable view, death penalty in general, an openness to the alternate conclusion based on the presentation at trial. But I don't think going beyond a general inquiry in that area to get to plug in specific attributes of specific crimes that may be charged here is appropriate or even helpful.

MS. CLARKE: Can we just have one second before we raise a sidebar question?

THE COURT: Is that about the next juror?

MS. CLARKE: The last one.

MR. MELLIN: Your Honor, can I also make one other observation, or ask the Court to consider that when a juror does come in and expresses some equivocation or hesitation in their questionnaire about whether they can impose the death penalty, we would ask the Court to consider asking the question about would they be able to do that. I think in my experience with these cases, jurors are able to check a box on the questionnaire, but once they've had a chance to go back and think about it, a lot of times, even though they may have philosophically believed in the death penalty and that may be what drove their answer on the questionnaire, when you ask jurors point blank, Would you really be able to go back and vote to impose the death penalty, there are a lot of different answers that jurors give to that type of question. And that's ultimately what the government is entitled to, which is a death-qualified jury, and it's hard to ferret that out from the questionnaire.

THE COURT: Well, I think my answer is the same as in the other direction. I think the questionnaire does a good job of that, actually, and we've had people who have said things like that, "I could never do it myself. I don't want to be responsible for it." So I don't think it's necessary to repeat that.

Again, this is a very thorough questionnaire that was prepared after considerable thought, and I think it's really in areas of ambiguity that I think we should be directing our attention for this process principally.

MS. CLARKE: Your Honor, there is a question -- perhaps the government has information. I think we got it from them -- about this juror with a --

THE COURT: Okay. Can we --

MS. CLARKE: Sidebar?

THE COURT: Yeah. Can we cut the audio?

sidebarsidebarJuror Follow-Up Requests and Questioning Limits

(Discussion at sidebar and out of the hearing of the public:)

[REDACTED]

THE COURT: And I have another question that requires follow-up.

(Discussion off the record.)

[REDACTED]

(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: He's gone. Our process is that when they're finished here, they're told to go along.

MS. CONRAD: Well, so how should we in the future handle follow-up questions, your Honor?

THE COURT: Are there any other people in this category?

THE COURT: Well, if you could tell us who they are in advance, we'll ask them to pause for a moment while we consider that.

MS. CONRAD: But we won't also know which questions, for example --

THE COURT: No, but you'll know if there's an inconsistency on the criminal history question.

MS. CONRAD: Well, like on the shelter in place, we don't know if your Honor is going to ask that question or not ask that question.

THE COURT: Well, I generally am not going to repeat questions that are in the questionnaire. And if it's a relatively unambiguous answer, that's the answer.

MS. CONRAD: I would respectfully request that your Honor ask them where they were on April 15th and on April 19th, 2013, because that's going to give us the answers about whether they would have sheltered in place or --

THE COURT: I think it's -- again, you're amending and extending the questionnaire which was jointly proposed and thoroughly addressed all of these areas. It is the primary instrument of information, and we're following up to clarify things, and that's the principal inquiry here. It's not a prelude to, you know, an open-ended interrogation of the prospective jurors so --

MS. CONRAD: I don't --

THE COURT: This is not going to be attorney voir dire by indirection.

MS. CONRAD: But, your Honor, I, at least, didn't understand that that was the case.

THE COURT: Well --

MS. CONRAD: I thought that the questionnaire was the initial series of screening questions to determine whether people could be excused for cause based on their questionnaire. I thought based on what your Honor has previously said, including about venue, that there would be a searching voir dire, and a searching voir dire would include where they were on April 19th, whether they sheltered in place, whether they have -- you know, what they've been exposed to in the media.

And, for example, with [REDACTED], when he says "My wife had a tough time after treating victims in the ICU," what exactly he means by that and how that affects him. It seems to me that those are appropriate follow-up questions. And if we can at least have the juror step out after being questioned by your Honor, and at least at that point be asked if we have any follow-up questions as opposed to forecasting before the questions are asked what follow-up questions we might want in response to the jurors' answers -- I think that puts us in an impossible position.

And I would respectfully request that after your Honor asks the questions the juror be asked to wait outside and we have an opportunity to propose additional follow-up questions suggested either by the questionnaire or by the answers. But I don't think we should --

THE COURT: Well, yes. We will pause with the juror for that opportunity. But I want to repeat that the -- again, much of this has been addressed and we have answers on many of these questions. We have shelter-in-place answers in the questionnaires, and so on and so forth; we have answers about friends being involved, and so on and so forth. So I think the questionnaire has adequately raised those issues and elicited responses in a general matter, so I don't think we have to reinvent the entire inquiry.

If there are particular ambiguities or if there's potential inconsistencies as with respect to the last juror, then fine. That can be an appropriate area. Or if an ambiguity that hasn't appeared to me appears in one of the answers, we can follow up on it. But it's generally not an opportunity, as I say, for attorney voir dire by indirection, that's all.

So we'll proceed with the next one.

Continue to next page4.Individual Voir Dire — Impartiality and Capital Punishment