David I. Bruck

David I. Bruck urged life imprisonment without release for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in his defense penalty-phase opening on Day 53. He argued that Tamerlan led the crimes and strongly influenced his younger brother, while expressly rejecting claims that Dzhokhar was forced to participate or could not control himself. Earlier, he opposed excluding the brothers' relationship and relative roles from guilt-phase evidence, arguing that the defense needed to answer the prosecution's account of motive. No ruling was recorded in that exchange.

During jury selection, Bruck sought deeper questioning about publicity, prior guilt opinions, and willingness to consider mitigation and either sentence. He objected to questions asking whether prospective jurors could sentence this defendant to death. The court restricted defendant-specific death questions but upheld its approach to questioning jurors with preconceived guilt opinions. Bruck maintained that questionnaire negotiations had not waived defense objections, and the court recognized a standing request and objection concerning proposed mitigation-related questions.

His guilt-phase cross-examinations developed distinctions between the brothers and tested physical evidence and observation limits. Dun Meng confirmed Tamerlan's armed actions, said he saw no other gun, and recalled Dzhokhar first asking about playing music. James Eppard distinguished shading in a trial exhibit from the FBI release and recalled the white-hat individual walking behind Tamerlan. Todd Brown confirmed finding no weapons or explosives in the boat, described apparent inward-going bullet holes, and acknowledged that he had not seen Tsarnaev emerge. Through Matthew Hess, Bruck introduced nine photographs of the Mercedes over objection, arguing that bullet damage could explain the defendant's driving. He also challenged Matthew Levitt's limited review, competing explanations of radicalization, religious interpretations, compensation, and retweets of testimony coverage.

Bruck disputed the boundaries between injury evidence and victim impact. The court rejected his renewed guilt-phase objection to survivor testimony about extended surgical treatment. In the penalty phase, it rejected his proposed family-only limit on victim-impact testimony concerning Sean Collier, while cautioning against repetition. Bruck also objected that proposed testimony about pain suffered by the deceased exceeded Dr. David King's disclosure. The court conditionally barred undisclosed victim-specific opinions while allowing general injury testimony and limiting King's military background.

For mitigation, Bruck examined Michel Reynolds about Chechen family hierarchy and differences in the brothers' online materials, then used redirect to clarify cultural patterns and Reynolds's earlier article. Through Sonya Petri, he presented Anzor Tsarnaev's psychiatric and head-injury records and an admitted treatment summary. His examinations of Mark Bezy developed communication restrictions under special administrative measures, tracked renewals, and barriers to progression at ADX. Bezy offered qualified opinions supporting continued placement, not a guarantee of permanent restrictions. The court denied Bruck's mistrial request over the government's confinement questioning but agreed with his objection to portraying government-designated officials as defense-chosen witnesses left uncalled.

Bruck preserved disputes over the sentencing decision itself. He requested an instruction explaining nonunanimity, arguing that jurors might otherwise surrender conscientious views to avoid a repeat trial. The judge refused the instruction and barred related closing argument; Bruck preserved a Sixth Amendment objection. He also objected to the sentencing weighing standard and exclusion of life without release as a listed mitigating factor. His double-counting challenge to the marathon-selection aggravator met the judge's conclusion that the factors were distinct. When jurors asked about gateway factors, Bruck argued for personal involvement and culpability rather than importing aiding-and-abetting liability. The parties ultimately agreed to refer jurors to the existing personal-actions-and-intent instruction.