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2015 Federal TrialtranscripttranscriptJuror Challenges and Qualification Rulings - Day 6 - 2015 Federal TrialThe court ruled on juror challenges near the end of Day 6, denying several defense challenges and excusing other jurors. Juror 60 remained qualified for now, with renewed defense argument permitted after transcript review.
Aloke ChakravartySteven D. MellinNadine PellegriniWilliam D. WeinrebDavid I. BruckJudy ClarkeMiriam ConradGeorge A. O'Toole Jr.James McAlearTHE COURTMS. CLARKEMR. WEINREBMR. BRUCKMR. CHAKRAVARTYMS. CONRADMS. PELLEGRINIMR. MELLINCourt ClerkJames McAlearsidebar
2015 Federal Trial/Day 6/January 20, 2015
9 pages·0 witnesses·1,806 lines
Capital-trial instructions and individual voir dire addressed publicity, impartiality, punishment views and hardship. The court set limits on questioning, provisionally qualified Juror 60, excused Jurors 65, 70 and 76, and denied several challenges.
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sidebarsidebarJuror Challenges and Qualification Rulings

(Discussion at sidebar and out of the hearing of the public:)

THE COURT: Some of these we've implicitly resolved, I think, but we should go through them one by one.

First, 48, who was the add-on.

MS. CLARKE: Is an agreed strike.

THE COURT: I agree. Let me just say "agreed" may not necessarily always do it. I may have a different view. But I do agree.

MS. CLARKE: Oh, okay.

THE COURT: In other words, these "agreed" are a little bit different from the "agreed" on the paper only because I've seen all these people. That's just a footnote to the process. I'm reserving my prerogative.

MS. CLARKE: In those situations, Judge, you may tell us that we're not quite done if we say, "Your Honor," because there could be more follow-up if the Court --

THE COURT: It depends on the stage. Sure. That's right.

MS. CLARKE: Fifty-eight is agreed.

THE COURT: Yes, we suspended that early.

Fifty-nine?

THE COURT: I can't remember. She went pretty far into it, but I agree that she should be excused.

Sixty?

MR. BRUCK: On 60, your Honor, we don't have a motion now but we wonder -- we'd like to review the transcript and be sure. There's an issue that we wanted to review. We were looking at notes, and it was pretty hard to tell if there was a problem. There may not be a motion, but if we determine after reviewing the transcript tonight that we would like to make one, we would like leave to be able to do that tomorrow morning. It shouldn't take long.

MR. WEINREB: Your Honor, we'd prefer to do them the same day, move the process along.

THE COURT: Can you tell me what the issue relates to?

MR. BRUCK: Well, it has to do with her uncertainty as to her ability to accord the presumption of innocence. But we wanted to -- our notes were a little bit --

THE COURT: No, that got pretty fuzzy on a couple -- it's because laypeople have difficulty with separating what they think is their lay real-world understanding of thoughts about innocence or guilt and the duty that they perform when they are jurors. And I think a couple of them were getting confused on that because of the way the questions were answered.

I don't remember if this was the particular one who was the most confused, but she may have been. I don't think that would be an adequate -- as I recall it, and taking the whole thing into account, including the way she answered the questions. So I -- the transcript is what it is, but it is not the full presentation, which includes what we all observed and how that colors the transcript. So the fact that the transcript may include a formulation of words, that seems to be one thing that is incomplete, I guess, and it has to be understood in the full context.

MR. BRUCK: I suppose what I'm asking is just that if we should determine for the record that there should be a motion, could we make the motion in the morning rather than now?

THE COURT: Well, here's a slight change on that. I think she's qualified, okay? If you think you can go to the transcript and develop an argument that would lead me to change that, I would be happy to entertain that.

MR. BRUCK: Certainly thank you.

THE COURT: So for now I'd put her in the qualified category.

Juror 61 we sent on his way.

Juror No. 62?

MS. CLARKE: Is agreed.

THE COURT: Yup. I agree with that as well.

Sixty-three was a self-employment issue, if I recall?

THE COURT: Sixty-four, the Carney Hospital lab manager. Any?

MR. BRUCK: We have no motion.

THE COURT: All right. So she's in.

Sixty-five?

THE COURT: Here's one where I disagree with you. If it's hardship -- is that what your -- basis for your agreement was?

MR. CHAKRAVARTY: Hardship was the basis.

THE COURT: I disagree. I think she can bear it. And I say this principally on her body language, frankly. She's not like -- there was a woman earlier on who was the only person in the shop. This one is not the only person. It sounded like there was coverage for her duties. It sounded to me like while she hadn't approached the subject explicitly with her employer, and while he had said some things, I was reading that to say she had gotten the go-ahead if she had to.

I could be wrong about that. If I am wrong, she'll squeal, and we'll maybe re-examine it, but my sense was that it was a bearable burden.

MS. CONRAD: Well, do you want to address this in terms of connections or do you want me to --

(Discussion off the record.)

MS. CONRAD: If I may, your Honor, I would also challenge her based on her connections to the events. Her sister attended the wedding of the brother-in-law's cousin who was a nurse to a victim who was recovering. And we actually have the article from the Boston Herald about that.

THE COURT: Is he going to be a witness?

MS. CONRAD: I don't know.

THE COURT: Well, is he on the witness list?

MS. CONRAD: I don't know, but...

MR. CHAKRAVARTY: I don't know the name of the person.

MS. CONRAD: Well, I'll tell you in a second. It looks like [REDACTED]and [REDACTED]. But I have a basis separate and apart from whether they're witnesses.

MS. PELLEGRINI: They're not witnesses. I don't believe either one of them are on the witness list.

THE COURT: All right. I left my witness list upstairs.

MS. CONRAD: May I hand this up?

(Pause.)

MS. CONRAD: So her sister goes to this wedding, and I guess she had heard about the connection. And she said she hasn't met the cousin or the cousin's husband, new husband. But that doesn't mean that, you know, a family gathering -- let's say the sister -- there's a family funeral, there's a -- for the in-laws, there's a wedding for the in-laws, the cousin's going to be there, just like the sister was at the cousin's wedding. And this is somebody who was grievously injured in the bombing and was treated by -- during the recovery at Spaulding Rehab -- by this sister's cousin. And it seems to me that that's too close a connection.

In addition, when she was asked about whether she could presume Mr. Tsarnaev innocent, she said, "I think so." But she said, "I know how I feel. I feel pretty strongly. I don't know if I could change my mind." And it seems to me that that combination of factors requires that she be challenged as someone who cannot be fair and impartial.

She also -- everything was a little -- well, certainly short of certainty. She thought she could abide for the most part -- oh, I'm sorry. That had to do with following directions not to listen to anything.

Right. She also is uncertain about whether she'll get paid. So she's somebody -- it's unfortunate that she didn't speak with her employer before she came back in today, but it seems to me there's a high likelihood that even if she got on, then she would later on find out she can't get paid and she's going to want to get off.

THE COURT: That's possible. My instinct is against that, but it's possible.

Do you want to respond to the other points?

MR. WEINREB: We don't agree with any of the other points. We don't think any of them are a basis for striking her. Our main concern is the same, which is that -- she wrote here, "I'm a single household and don't have a cushion to pay mortgage and other bills," and our concern would simply be if the employer says, you know, "I'll pay you for five days or for ten days and then you're on your own" --

MR. WEINREB: -- what happens then?

I mean, what if she says, "If I stay on this jury I'm going to be homeless"?

THE COURT: I expect if that is the case, we'll hear from her. In my experience, if somebody has been passed on a denied hardship and it gets worse than they imagined, we usually hear back. And so that would not surprise me. And so we'll have room to substitute somebody. That's my view.

This is -- you know, it's an assessment of a burden which is sometime in the future. So it's not an automatic or easily ascertained quantification of the degree of discomfort and so on and so forth. So I just -- I didn't get the sense as you get from some others -- and some of this is personality, perhaps -- that this was going to be a real problem as opposed to one that might occur.

One might have thought, for example, that between the time she filled out the questionnaire and the time she came back today she would have had that discussion because it would have armed her more solidly than what she had today. So I'm reading between those lines and think that she had maybe gotten the signal that she will get paid.

MR. WEINREB: I'll only add that she wrote at the bottom here, "So I'll need your help with this should I be chosen." Maybe she didn't want to have the conversation until she had something from the Court in hand.

THE COURT: Maybe. And if I'm wrong in my reading of her and she has that conversation that she's not going to get paid, we can revisit it, obviously. But my sense of today was -- and I guess I say that in light of my overall assessment of her, which I thought she was a very thoughtful and careful question-answerer, and that's -- well, that influences my assessment of some of the other issues too, I guess.

So I don't know if you want to --

MR. WEINREB: No, I have nothing further.

MR. MELLIN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I think she explained the -- she gave good answers, I thought candid answers, about the cousin marrying the victim. It doesn't seem like it's something present in her mind necessarily; no real relationship with that person. It just didn't seem to be a strong influence on her thinking. So I think she's okay. I would pass her.

MR. MELLIN: Your Honor, going forward, when one of these issues comes up and if we have agreed -- I think we had both stopped questioning these jurors -- is there some way that the Court wants us to kind of address that?

THE COURT: She went pretty much to the end.

MS. CONRAD: I had more for her, actually. I think, for example, she said in response to Question 78 as far as whether you expressed your opinion to anyone else, she said, "I expressed that I couldn't imagine what evidence would come forth that would prove him not guilty. And I hope this case would" -- I think it says "would not get moved elsewhere." But I certainly would have asked her about "I can't imagine what evidence would come forth that would make me prove him not guilty."

Now, your Honor did ask about the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, but it still seems to me that that question bears exploring.

I also would note -- this is a more general point, but maybe it's appropriate to raise it now -- your Honor is framing the presumption of innocence as at the outset a defendant is presumed innocent when, in fact, the law is that the presumption of innocence remains with the defendant throughout the trial. And so we would object to the framing of "at the outset."

In addition, your Honor's saying, "Can you suspend your mind?" Well, it's more than suspending your mind to presume someone to be innocent. And I certainly would have explored that more with her had I not believed that she was going to be excused by agreement.

I think -- you know, the fact that she hasn't met this cousin doesn't mean she's not going to meet this cousin in the future. And to have a social or family interaction with someone who was grievously injured and whose cousin helped bring them to at least some improved health and have to face them as a juror who potentially voted to acquit the defendant or rejected the death penalty it seems to me is going to be far more than just an awkward social situation when and if it comes up, and presumably it will come up.

When her sister's husband has a death in the family or has a wedding in the family, the cousin's going to be there, just like her sister was at that wedding. Who knows. It could even happen during this trial.

THE COURT: You were reading from an answer?

THE COURT: Can you tell me where it is?

MS. CONRAD: Page 20. I hope I have the right person. Yeah. Page 20, Question 78.

THE COURT: I don't think you have --

MS. CONRAD: I'm sorry. Am I looking at the wrong person?

THE COURT: I think you are.

MS. CONRAD: Oh, I'm sorry. I'll go back.

No, I don't think I am.

THE COURT: Oh, wait a minute.

MS. CONRAD: Juror 65.

THE COURT: Oh, yes. I see it. Okay.

MS. CONRAD: Page 20, Question 78.

THE COURT: Oh, yes.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: I see it. Okay.

MS. CONRAD: She also talks in Question 75 about the anxiety she experienced when she got the summons. She said that when she realized it was for this case, she was devastated. That was her word, "devastated." Now, I don't know if "devastated" refers to the hardship or if that referred to the emotion relating to her own experience or her in-laws' experience.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. We'll --

MS. CONRAD: The other thing I would have asked her about is Number 93. She said -- I certainly would have asked her about that. I had it on my list of questions. She says as far as life imprisonment, comparing it to the death penalty, "as long as he doesn't get solitary. Put him in with the general population which, in my view, is less humane than death."

Now, numerous people have commented online, news reports, "Oh, why don't they just put him in general population and that will take care of him." And it has that flavor of sort of street justice. And I certainly would have asked about that had I not thought that there was no need for further questioning.

And if there is -- if she's not going to be excused, I would suggest that maybe she be brought back, we ask about -- or maybe ask her to ask about the payment issue, and I be given an opportunity to follow up on these points that I didn't follow up on.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Well, I think perhaps I will yield on this in light of the termination of the examination early. I guess I was reading it as we'd had a long examination and we were finished; I didn't realize we were cutting it short. It wasn't really very short in toto. But if there were things that would have been asked otherwise, I think that I will, as I say, yield to the view even -- anyway, I'll just leave it at that. So we'll excuse her.

MS. CONRAD: Thank you.

THE COURT: But we'll have to work out a system for -- it's a little bit -- where it may be arguable but not unambiguous that -- for example, hardship is perhaps the -- a likely place where that might be true.

MS. CONRAD: Well, would it make sense to address it at the time, maybe send the juror out momentarily, have that discussion on the record? If the Court --

THE COURT: Yeah, I guess the problem here was I didn't -- I thought people were just done questioning; I didn't think it was being suspended. I thought people were just saying "we're through." And maybe you were through, but it was for a reason that I misapprehended.

MS. CLARKE: So perhaps we should say, your Honor, It appears the parties are satisfied or agreed, or the day is purple?

(Laughter.)

THE COURT: Yeah, right.

MR. BRUCK: Maybe it makes most sense if we can send the juror out but not discharge them, resolve what's going to happen, and then give the juror further instructions through the --

MR. WEINREB: But if we have a lengthy discussion about it, then we're going to have to send the reporters out every time and turn off the sound every time.

THE COURT: Yeah, so there are people that it's apparent immediately because we get to this hardship question early, if it's hardship that the issue is. And so if it's suspended then, there are clearly other questions that would be asked about other issues, so it's obvious that that's it. If at that point I was at odds with the parties' view of the hardship, I guess we could deal with that because it would be obvious.

The question is more when it goes deeper into the examination and a number of different issues are rather extendedly inquired about and then the parties say "that's enough," that's a pretty ambiguous signal.

MS. CLARKE: Maybe the parties should say, "Should the parties continue?" We communicate across the table --

THE COURT: Well, anyway, you could figure out a way to signal that you would have other questions, but...

MS. CLARKE: The pearl is in the oyster.

MR. BRUCK: Two if by land.

MR. WEINREB: We're really going to date ourselves.

(Laughter.)

THE COURT: 66 I think you agreed. We didn't even -- was that an issue about his language skills?

MS. CLARKE: 67 was agreed.

THE COURT: Yeah. And let me just say on that, I actually had some concern on behalf of the institution that she works for, whether they needed a licensed administrator on premises for a certain amount of time and so on. So it wasn't just her own problem; it struck me it might be a problem for the institution. That was a guess.

69?

MR. BRUCK: Yes, your Honor. 69 we do have a motion. And here, this is a somewhat unusual juror in that our concern comes from what was not said. This is the case of the dog that didn't bark.

This juror occupies a very highly placed position at Mass. General. We recognize it's not physically in the hospital building, but she -- her questionnaire seems to have been studiously avoiding acknowledging things which any well-educated, aware person in Boston would likely have known in her position. The fact that the President of the United States visited Mass. General, her hospital, three days after the bombing and toured the facility was something that she did not know, hadn't heard or didn't remember, strains credulity.

The President's host during at least part of this tour was a witness in this case, Dr. David King, who's the subject of a motion in limine from the defense to exclude his testimony. There is a lot of Mass. General in this case, and this is a lot of risk.

Now, on top of that, this is a person whose work -- when she goes back to work on Friday has access to patient records. She won't go looking for them -- or at least we haven't established that she will -- but they could pop up without any warning at any time.

She is just very deep into an institution which is very deep into this case in a legal sense, in a factual sense, and also in an emotional sense. This is some very, very compelling, emotionally gripping testimony having to do with Mass. General. And it just seems that her imperviousness to this is suspicious. Everything about her responses shout that she wants to be on this jury. She wants to be on this jury badly. She is auditioning for this jury.

It's a discretionary call, I realize. We're asking the Court to draw comments and conclusion from things that were not said, but I think the conclusions are very clear, and that this lady -- given the challenges that we're facing in trying to find a jury in Boston, this is the kind of eyes in the back of your head that I think the Court has to have. There are many more jurors in the pool, and I think we should go past this one.

MR. WEINREB: Your Honor, we object to the motion. I respectfully disagree with Mr. Bruck's assessment of this juror. I saw nothing in her demeanor that suggested she was prevaricating or was being -- willfully denying things that were -- that were true. And I -- so I don't think there was anything about her demeanor or about the nature of her answers, the way she looked or sounded, that suggested that she was lying. And I also don't think there's anything suspicious about her answers.

Mass. General is part of Partners Healthcare. It's the single largest private employer in the state. It's a huge, huge corporation. She does not work at Mass. General; she works for the MGPO, Mass. General Physicians Organization. It's essentially a billing business. Coding and billing. She works -- she doesn't work at the hospital; she doesn't work with the doctors. She's a very high-level director with many, many levels of management beneath her. To the point where she seemed to say with even a little bit of embarrassment that she didn't think she'd recognize any of the doctors' names, that's how distant she is from the institution.

I don't think it's a stretch to believe that a person who, again, keeps her nose to the grindstone and is working at this kind of job is not someone who would not necessarily know that the President visited Mass. General. She wasn't there. She doesn't seem to -- doesn't seem like she spends any time there. She certainly doesn't work there. I think it's just too speculative a ground on which to strike her.

THE COURT: I don't think the connection with Mass. General is something we have to worry about with her. I would reject the motion. She is essentially a business person rather than a healthcare person, it seems. She's on a different campus, focused on her own bureaucracy. I don't see any reason in that to be concerned by itself, but also to doubt any of her other answers which seemed to be very thoughtful and careful and serious. So I don't see any reason to excuse her. I think she qualifies.

By the way, I didn't remember the President visited Mass. General, but that's because I'm getting old.

MS. CLARKE: We agree to strike.

(Laughter.)

THE COURT: Number 70. This is the stay-at-home mother, but she also had -- is there a motion?

MR. WEINREB: There is from the government.

Your Honor, this juror is prevented -- or at the very least substantially impaired from considering the death penalty. She said she believed there was literally no case in which death penalty is an appropriate penalty no matter how bad the crime is. It is her lifelong belief, and asking her to impose the death penalty would be asking her to go against one of her core beliefs that she said she could not set aside.

MR. BRUCK: No argument.

THE COURT: All right. We'll excuse her.

71. We may have terminated him early because of hardship, I think.

THE COURT: Yeah. So he's excused.

Number 73 is the -- we learned today is a full-time student.

MS. CLARKE: Same thing.

MR. BRUCK: Your Honor, we move to excuse Juror 74 based on the totality of the personal involvement that she has in this case. We recognize that she is a very appealing young woman who was trying very hard to think about being impartial, but there's just too much here.

She was in -- she was living in Watertown at the time, or on the very border, considered herself living in a Watertown community. She would have sheltered in place had she not been out of town. Her boyfriend and his roommates sheltered in place. She is a graduate of UMass Dartmouth. There's going to be a great deal of testimony about her alma mater and about how this greatly impacted and afflicted the university she went to.

In that connection, one of the witnesses on the government's witness list -- on the witness list -- is Professor Williams, who was her history professor, she said. She did not identify him on her juror questionnaire as a witness and -- although his name appeared. It could very well be that she'll find herself having another history lesson from her professor in this case if the government calls him and has him testify. There is going to be -- there well could be expert-type testimony about the sorts of areas that he taught. She was a history major.

I have to say this could well be the first case in which -- in the history of American jurisprudence in which the jury bought the T-shirt before they sat in the jury box, and this is one of those jurors. She was given a Boston Strong T-shirt. She wears it every other week. She ran in the Watertown Strong 5K race. She talked very articulately about the meaning of Boston Strong and what it signifies.

And then there are her brothers. And that was the point I think when she really -- her conviction that she could be impartial flagged for a moment. She had to consider the question -- or she did -- was asked the question about "If there was evidence that this crime was committed because of the American war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan, would that affect your impartiality?" And she really wavered on that. In the end she said she thought she could put that and everything else aside, but it's too much to ask.

You know, to compare this juror to a normal trial where none of these issues come up for any of the jury -- members of the jury panel, again, it's -- you know, imagine 12 jurors that had her confluence of experience with witnesses, with ties, with connections, and no one would think we had a fair jury. Well, what's true for 12 is true for one, and with all due respect to this young woman, who's very admirable and very likable and doing her best, but there's just too much here.

I think in the Court's discretion and to guarantee the right to a fair trial, she should be excused.

MR. WEINREB: Your Honor, the government objects. I disagree that this is a case where the whole is more than the sum of the parts. And many of the parts are insubstantial, starting with the least of them, the T-shirt. She explained it was a gift from a supervisor who bought five people T-shirts. She said she wears it once every two weeks as a workout shirt. It does not seem to occupy a place of honor or any special place in her wardrobe.

She described the Watertown Strong race as being silly, obviously not something that she finds very moving or important to her. She -- my recollection is that she struggled to describe what Boston Strong meant and gave an answer that anybody who had heard the phrase and lived anywhere in the country, you know, could have given, nothing signaling any particular connection to this case or any particular care or thought to the idea of it any more than any intelligent person would give.

Again, with respect to living on the border of Watertown, she seemed very confident that that would have no impact at all on her ability to be fair and impartial. She graduated from UMass Dartmouth ten years ago, and so it's not like her connection there was that recent. And she, again, also without hesitation, said that it would not affect her ability to be fair and impartial.

Although it's true that Professor Williams is on the witness list, if she is a juror he will not be a witness, and, in fact, right now we don't intend to call him as a witness at all. But we can stipulate that if she's on the jury, he won't be a witness. So that is a nonissue there. There are 700-plus people on the government's witness list. Only a fraction of those are actually going to be called to trial.

As to why she didn't recognize his name, it is a pretty common name; it's not an employee who's identified as a professor. And furthermore, his name is on the list as Brian Glynn Williams, which might have made it even less recognizable. Indeed, if she's like me, she might not have known any of her professor's first names while she was in college, or not all of them. And Williams is certainly as common as can be.

And then when it came to her brothers serving in the military, I would argue that the thoughtfulness with which she addressed that is actually a mark in her favor rather than one against her. It's -- she obviously was not somebody who simply wants to be on the jury and was going to say whatever the obvious answer was to get her on. She gave it very thoughtful consideration. She didn't hesitate to say that that was -- of all these somewhat trivial concerns that have been voiced here, that that one was a non-trivial one and was one that would -- gave her some pause.

Again, after pausing she thought about it and she was confident that it would not affect her. And, in fact, when Mr. Bruck was questioning her, in the very last question or -- I don't remember if it was Mr. Bruck or Ms. Clarke, but she was asked, "Do you believe despite all of these things that we've talked about you could be fair and impartial?" She said very firmly, "I'm confident that I can." And I think the Court saw the way in which she said that and saw her demeanor throughout her questioning, and it was one that inspired confidence as well.

MR. BRUCK: If I might very briefly, I mean, it raises these odd questions, the government now offers to trim their witness list around a juror. It's conceivable that Professor Williams would be a witness for us, although we don't -- I mean, it's not beyond the realm of possibility.

It raises these strange questions: Does she keep wearing her Boston Strong T-shirt while she's on the jury? The brother -- she said one thing that was quite emotionally powerful. It was understated. She said he doesn't like to talk about it. And that speaks volumes. I mean, I know she was thoughtful but this is -- she was hit with this for the first time. What is behind that silence of her brother's and what does she think is there and what judgments does she make about what he experienced and what the cost was to him? And then to find out what was written on the boat, if she hadn't already read about it, there are just too many questions.

THE COURT: You know, this is a kind of holistic assessment of people, and I think she's okay on balance. She struck me as very serious, thoughtful, relatively articulate, and I thought -- this is -- this was sort of influential to me -- consistent. This process can produce multiple questions about the same issues, perhaps from different perspectives, and she would pause before answering and then give an answer that seemed to be the product of thought rather than rehearsal and was generally consistent among the questioners, so I took that as a sign of genuineness. So I think her seriousness and thoughtfulness will make her a good juror.

75?

MS. CONRAD: Yes, your Honor. We would challenge him based on hardship. He has said that he works on 100 percent commission. He said he could lose lots of clients if he was on this jury. He said that if he were on this jury for three to four months, his business could fall apart and that that could be distracting. And throughout his answers when asked about impartiality, he interspersed the phrase "aside from my business." And it seemed to me that was an ever-present concern on his mind.

He started out -- actually, when your Honor asked about whether he had followed recent events in Europe he said, well, he's been very, very busy at work. And although he said he could do some of his work at night and on weekends, obviously he couldn't do that work to the same extent that he appears to be doing it now.

And I would submit that his concern about loss of income and also the overall lasting effect on his business in terms of loss of clients is one that would interfere with his ability to serve in this case.

MR. WEINREB: Your Honor, this juror perhaps more than any of the ones I think we've seen so far seemed perfectly able and willing to speak his mind, to express his opinion despite a lot of back-and-forth questioning by the attorneys and a lot of complex formulations of questions. Every single one he gave it a great deal of thought and told us without unnecessary words exactly how he felt.

He was asked whether he had a hardship. On Question 10 he wrote "no hardship." He was given every opportunity to say: This would be too big a financial burden for me. This would be a financial burden that would be one that would leave me unable to pay the bills, unable to pay the mortgage, all the things that we have heard other jurors say, but he didn't go there. And I think we can take him at his word.

He had two concerns that prompted some of his answers about anxiety about serving on the jury. One had to do with scheduling, which he said was the primary concern; the second one had to do with the loss of income. And he said knowing that he would not be sequestered and --

THE COURT: No, that was the architect.

MR. WEINREB: Oh, I'm sorry.

(Pause.)

MR. WEINREB: Saving all of that for the next guy --

(Laughter.)

MR. WEINREB: -- who we're going to say the same motion on the same ground, I'll say that this guy, he was not somebody who we heard so much from, and yet he did not say that it would be too much of a hardship, and, in fact, wrote "no hardship." And based on that it seems speculative to say we need to strike him on that ground.

MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, if I may, though, the question doesn't say, "Do you have a hardship"; the question on the questionnaire says, "Does it impose a special hardship on you such that it would be difficult or impossible for you to serve?" And I think in line with a lot of these jurors with respect particularly to the hardship question, they fill out the questionnaire and then they have ten days-two weeks to think about it. And he did not say it would not be a hardship; he said that it could cause his business to fall apart. And it strikes me that between now and when he gets seated, if he gets seated, he may come to the conclusion that he just can't do it because it's going to be such an impact on his income and on his business.

THE COURT: I thought there was a disconnect between his saying that he thought it might cause his business to fall apart and his demeanor, which showed no concern about that occurrence. I mean, he was a little bit remarkable in saying: I'll lose clients and I'll lose income and, oh, well. These things happen.

MS. CONRAD: I think that's a cause for concern.

THE COURT: I think it indicated that he didn't feel it as a hardship as he said in his written questionnaire. But, of course, that's a summary, and then we get to hear more about it. If it's a burden to him, it seemed a burden he was willing to accept.

MS. CONRAD: But that raises questions. I mean, he also -- and I realize Mr. Weinreb was talking about somebody else, but he consistently, when asked questions about, you know, "Have you formed an opinion about the defendant's guilt," he went to, "I could keep an open mind." That's not the question. The question is: Have you -- do you have an opinion about the defendant's guilt? And it strikes me that he's somebody who maybe has an agenda.

THE COURT: Yeah. I didn't get that -- I was alert to that because of what I referred to as the sort of disconnect, but I don't think so on my assessment. He seemed straightforward to me, and I think we can take his answers at face value.

Now we have 76.

MR. BRUCK: Yes. Juror 76 -- and I'd like to say at the outset this was a very long examination. It was complicated. Depending on the Court's inclination at the end of hearing us out, I think this may be a case where it might be best to defer a final ruling until we can review the transcript. But I don't think that should be necessary because I think it is reasonably clear that this juror should be disqualified.

Let's look at what happened to him. He first said that he -- not first, but he said he believed the defendant to be guilty and he believed the death penalty should be imposed. He said that he had told his wife that he thought the death penalty should be imposed. Later, on voir dire, he did not recall that. When it was pointed out to him, he acknowledged that that was so.

I don't mean to suggest this is not a candid juror. On the contrary. I think the problem with this juror was that he came to court thinking that all of the decisions that a juror has to make are simple, factual ones. And he said this several times over, that as to the factual issues, he could put what he had experienced and learned and knew out of his mind even though had had paid a great deal of attention to the media in this case, but as to -- what was the term he used -- "subjective," by which I think he used that as a synonym for "discretionary," the jury's discretion, he didn't realize that juries exercise discretion until you explained it to him and until the parties explained it to him, and then it became clear that there were two types of decisions that he had to make, and he could be unbiased as to the facts but he could not be unbiased as to subjective decisions, discretionary decisions, what the Supreme Court has called a reasoned moral response to the evidence that is required of every juror in a capital case.

And then let's consider where these problems came from. He has a daughter -- I think a son who was ten and a daughter who was six. His friend took her children and her children's friends, including an eight-year-old child, to the marathon, and were so close -- I mean, they were there when the bombs went off. He heard about it from them.

He thought not only in a general way that this could have been his family, his children, but quite specifically said, "If we hadn't gone to a baseball practice that day" -- and he's not just thinking that he could have been -- that he could have been in his friend's situation; he's thinking he could have been in the Richards' family situation. That is clearly what was weighing on him. You were a little bit closer to him than me, but it looked to me like he was on the verge of tears, and this is a very controlled man.

His answers were remarkably clipped: "Yup." "Yes." He was cutting the words off in a way that suggested a real struggle to maintain control of his emotions. And who can blame him given these facts?

He also sheltered in place. He described the -- his direct personal involvement, the impact of the events of April 19th on him and his family.

Again, you know, the premise of being able to try this case in Boston was that there are 5 million people here. Well, there aren't 5 million people who have a story like that to tell.

There's no disrespect to this man. On the contrary. He is an admirable guy trying to be a citizen in the most admirable way, but that duty involves telling the truth and sorting out your feelings. And he finally did that.

Now, he gave answers which you can take out of context and say, Well, he did say he could do this and he did say he could do that, but we know what is really going on. And when he was speaking in his own words, he kept coming back to, "As to the facts, I can put this out of my mind. I can be objective. I can presume him innocent" or whatever, but as to the subjective issues, the fact that an eight-year-old boy -- his own son was eight years old two years ago, this is -- he said at one point in his own words, "I am concerned about my own impartiality." That's -- you know, the fact that he could be led to say, Well, but I can still do my duty, that doesn't help.

This juror really is not -- this is not the -- he would be a great juror in another case, but this is not the case for him.

MR. WEINREB: So first of all, I'll incorporate by reference everything I said before --

THE COURT: Revise and extend.

(Laughter.)

MR. WEINREB: -- and add the following: I understand -- well, I think Mr. Bruck has it wrong when he characterizes what the juror meant by "subjective." I think what he is characterizing is what Ms. Clarke meant by subjective, moral versus factual, but that is not the way in which that potential juror was using the words. I think it is quite clear he was using "subjective" to mean personal opinion based on what he has heard in the media, what his general beliefs are, personal comparisons between his own situation and what he has read about this case, and that he was using "objective" to mean a decision based on the facts and the law, a decision that would be based on the evidence put before him and the instructions the Court gave.

And so he kept saying that, you know, "I would decide the case objectively; I would not decide it subjectively." And I don't believe what he meant by that is that he would not make a reasoned moral judgment or anything like that because that is a concept that most jurors would have absolutely no understanding of without -- until it is explained to them, that.

So I think that on the contrary this seemed to be a juror who understood extremely well the difference between a decision based on the law and the facts, which is what the law requires, and decisions based on other things which he understands he would have to set aside.

And he seems to have given it -- he seems to be a very thoughtful guy. Every time he was asked whether he could do it, he gave it thought and knew. And every time he came out saying that he would be able to decide the case objectively, meaning on the law and the facts, and not based on subjective beliefs.

I think the fact of his clipped speech was not at all a sign that he was so emotional that he couldn't respond. He seems to be somebody who does not waste words. He thinks, he answers the question and he moves on.

I think it's inaccurate to say that he sheltered in place. I think what he said, unless I'm confusing him again, is that -- yes, that he went to his work on Congress Street, which is where people were told to shelter in place, and when he learned that everybody had to shelter in place there, he said, "I may as well just go home," and he drove home, seeming not to take the matter as seriously as one might imagine.

The fact that he has a son who is ten and a daughter who is six cannot disqualify him from being on the jury, that alone. I think nobody who has a child, or has ever had a child that age, will hear evidence that an eight-year-old was killed and that other children were injured and not draw those comparisons. No human being can be expected not to do that, and that wouldn't be an appropriate basis for striking somebody.

Jurors bring their common sense and their life experiences to the jury box, and that's something that we want. But what they have to set aside, is they have to be able to decide the case not based on emotion but on reason, and that was something he said repeatedly that he could do.

The fact that somebody might need to struggle to do that is not a strike against him, nor should it be a strike against him that he said "I'm concerned about my own impartiality." That's a thoughtful juror. That's somebody who has given some thought to the ways in which his own situation might affect him and has plumbed his own depths and asked himself: Can I put aside my subjective feelings and decide the case objectively? And that was the thing that he was quite confident and quite firm that he could do.

And on those grounds, he deserves an opportunity to sit on the jury.

MR. BRUCK: If I can briefly respond --

THE COURT: Not necessary. I agree with the objection. He's obviously an intelligent man and has thought about these things, but my impression is that he was struggling to keep control of his emotions, which is understandable, I agree with that, and at some level is tolerable. It seemed to be a -- almost a dual personality type of thing.

I think Mr. Bruck had it right when he pointed out that he was surprised by the two-phase format and what he would be asked to do in that second phase. He hadn't really thought about that. And I think it was hitting him that he might not be able to be as controlled under those circumstances as he would be in the first part.

So I think he should be struck for cause.

[REDACTED]

MS. CLARKE: And then 79, your Honor, I think we agreed.

THE COURT: I think we cut that short on his examination, that his income would be affected. I agree.

Okay. Now, so I guess -- I had thought Number 80 was here too, but I guess what happened was our jury administrator took literally the idea of 20 jurors, and so when we added someone at the beginning, we dropped someone off at the end. Let me admonish that that needn't be the case in the future. We can do 21 or 22 or 18. I just don't want to be reshuffling the deck every day.

MS. CLARKE: So we'll go from 60 to --

THE COURT: So can we catch up to where we would be, whatever that is?

MS. CLARKE: Is that 81?

THE COURT: I don't have a list. But whoever is in the next --

COURT CLERK: 80 is next.

THE COURT: 80 is next but --

MS. CLARKE: In order --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Let me just -- before 80 got moved from this panel to the next, the next panel began with either 81 or some nearby number and ran to something else.

THE COURT: We'll use that same end number, whatever it is. 80 gets added to tomorrow. If that makes it 21, that's fine. But we'll catch up -- we won't be one juror off the rest of the sequence.

MR. BRUCK: I think that's to 110, isn't it?

THE COURT: Whatever it is. Wherever the 20 is going to be when you assemble the packets.

JAMES MCALEAR: And 45 will also be -- she's coming in too.

THE COURT: Oh, that's right. So it may even be 22 tomorrow. I don't know. 45 was from last week.

Okay? Very good. That's it.

(The proceedings adjourned and the Court exited the courtroom at 4:32 p.m.)

Continue to Day 71.Questionnaire-Based Juror Excusals and Screening